

~~Top Secret~~

3.5(c)



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

~~Top Secret~~

3.5(c)

c 199

18 January 1968

Page Denied

~~TOP SECRET~~


3.5(c)

18 January 1968

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)



~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)



69336 1-68 CIA

~~TOP SECRET~~*Vietnam:

South Vietnam: The government's decision to release five of the six arrested labor leaders should ease labor tensions, but its plans to try Vo Van Tai, who was not released, could provoke new trouble.

Tai, secretary general of the Saigon Council of the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor, will be tried for violation of the law forbidding strikes, the minimum penalty for which is a five-year sentence.

The Lower House of the National Assembly elected Nguyen Ba Luong as its permanent chairman on 17 January. His election was brought about by an alliance between his pro-government Democratic Bloc and the largely Catholic Independence Bloc. The defeated candidate, Hue deputy Nguyen Dai Bang, is an outspoken government opponent. Two of the three other important posts in the house also went to individuals generally considered pro-government.

[REDACTED]
elements of the Communist B-3 Front are planning offensive action against allied positions in Pleiku Province in the near future.

3.3(h)(2)

On 16 January the headquarters of the North Vietnamese Army 1st Division informed an unidentified subordinate that new attacks are planned against the fire support base at Le Thanh and the Special Forces camp at Duc Co and that the area north and south of Route 19 would be liberated, "in the immediate future." In northeast Pleiku, unidentified elements of the Front have been noted discussing plans for a night mortar or artillery attack to be conducted between 17 and 19 January.

(continued)

18 Jan 68

1

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

[In remarks on 16 January which received wide publicity, Mai Van Bo, North Vietnamese representative in Paris, went a bit beyond the Trinh statement. Bo addressed the issues of timing and substance of postbombing talks, saying that they could start "after a suitable time" and that both the level of the talks and the agenda were negotiable. Such questions, he said, could be discussed during a preliminary "meeting between the two parties." He said Hanoi would accept either a public statement by the US or "any other procedure" which demonstrates US sincerity, but he ruled out any reciprocal North Vietnamese gesture.]

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

18 Jan 68

2

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

Page Denied

Page Denied

Page Denied

Page Denied

Page Denied

Page Denied

Page Denied

~~Top Secret~~



~~Top Secret~~